The claim that only patients who can pay have the right of access to health services, and therefore a right to health, is unacceptable to almost everyone nowadays, yet Glass (1976) said that in the connotation of planning health services 'need is a useless concept'. Although he was deliberately trying to be provocative, it is worth considering the merits of his statement.
There have been two very different approaches to the definition of need for health care. The older of the two was described by Donabedian (1974) as 'some disturbance in health and well being'; he continued 'need is defined, therefore, in terms of phenomena that require medical care services'. This is a 'humanitarian' view which implies that when there is human suffering we must do something about it. It concentrates attention on the identification of the suffering rather than on how it can be relieved. It is nevertheless paradoxical because although it is predicated in the belief that all the sick should be helped, it fails to take into account the consequence of limited resources for health care. If some of the needy receive the very best, nothing may be left for others. We cannot be endlessly generous and continue to be fair. These concerns have led Matthew (1971) and Cochrane (1976) , among others, to suggest that need should be recognised only when it can be met with 'some medical intervention that has positive utility and that actually alters the prognosis of the disease in some favourable way at reasonable cost' (Matthew, 1971) . Those Need and 'need for': the concept of equivalents Donabedian (1974) emphasised that the word 'need' should be reserved to describe states of people.
He added that each need will be met by some form of service. Furthermore, need viewed in this way can be translated into its 'equivalents' in terms not only of service but also of the resources necessary to provide the service required. By introducing the concept of equivalents he thus develops a model which disposes with the idea of 'need for'-need for hospitals, need for nurses etc., and confines the use of the word 'need' to the client.
A service equivalent of need is therefore a procedure or procedures that may be deployed to meet that need: for example, a consultation with a health professional-such as a cardiologist or a speech therapist, the prescribing and consumption of medicine, a surgical operation, or the use of an ambulance or a hospital bed. Therefore 'a particular bundle of services can be translated either into its capacity to satisfy need or into the resources required to produce that bundle of services, and a given set of resources has its equivalents in the services they can produce and the needs that they can satisfy .., thus need may be conceived and assessed in terms of three different, although related, phenomena' Donabedian (1974) . Figure 1 uses the model of Donabedian (1974) to illustrate the two approaches to defining need in relation to the delivery of health care. The doctor in his daily work decides case by case what the service equivalent of need will be in either approach, but whereas in the 'humanitarian' approach the allocation of resources will follow from his decision, and therefore may be inequitable, in the 'realistic' approach, decisions about service equivalents may, in any set of circumstances, be constrained by resource allocation.
Classification of phenomena underlying need
Underlying need are four phenomena: risk of morbidity, pain and discomfort, dysfunction (that is to say disability and impairment), and risk of mortality. Attempts to meet each kind of need should lead to an acceptable outcome and the needs, together with their outcomes, are shown in Fig. 2 . When need stems from actual morbidity, the optimum outcome that can be achieved may not be cure or even palliation, but death. The Hippocratic Oath does not deny the patient the right to death with dignity and it is perfectly proper for the doctor by his choice of service equivalents to prepare or support his patients with this end in view. When need arises from the risk of morbidity, the need is for prevention; it is the only form of need for which death is not an acceptable alternative.
To meet the need for prevention various actions can be taken. It may be possible to modify the environment, removing the component which is a risk to human health; to protect the client against the disease from which he is at risk either by immunisation or by educating him to change his behaviour; or to alter the course of the disease favourably as a result of early diagnosis.
Decisions about service and resource equivalents of need
Decisions about the service equivalents of need fall within the province of the medical profession. Whether a patient with duodenal ulcer is to be treated surgically or medically, whether one with varicose veins is to be treated as an outpatient or an inpatient, or whether a patient with acute myocardial ischaemia should be treated in a coronary care unit or in his own home are all, The RAWP knew with some accuracy the resources available for allocation. Their task was to match these to need; to assign resource equivalents of the various forms of aggregated need to the 13 regions in such a way as to enable services of equal quality, quantity, and accessibility to be provided throughout the country. But the RAWP lacked any direct measure of need, and was therefore compelled to use the number and the age/sex structure of the population adjusted for the magnitude and nature of the mortality experienced as an indirect measure of need (Department of Health and Social Security, 1976; Bennett and Holland, 1977) . Also lacking was detailed information about current judgements of service equivalents for the various forms of need; and as Fig. 1 shows, to link resource equivalents to need it is necessary to take service equivalents into account.
The needs arising from diabetes (ICD chapter III) (World Health Organisation, 1967), post partum haemorrhage (ICD chapter XI), and cerebral thrombosis (ICD chapter VII) are met in very different ways-that is to say each disease has very different service equivalents. In order to allocate resources for acute hospital care the RAWP decided to accept national bed usage for each ICD chapter as an index of service equivalents and to adjust this by each age and sex group in the population. These procedures are open to criticism on many grounds but that is not the point; the point is that indices of need and of service equivalents were chosen, and by estimating both it was possible to complete the equation. Resource equivalents of need for acute hospitals in each region, which seemed appropriate within the terms of the model, could be calculated (see Fig. 3 or the planners at area or regional level who have the responsibility for developing services, are obliged in future to continue to use the same service equivalents as they have in the past. They should be prepared to use any innovation which seems sensible provided that it can be obtained with the available resources. This proviso applies to any planning system which is working properly, and it is important because it may mean that time-honoured procedures of little, if any, value will have to be abandoned to allow the introduction of new ones. It may also mean acceptance of less than the very best. The consequences can be painful; as Klein (1977) indicated, the fact that increases in NHS costs in 1977-78 have had to be met out of an allocated budget probably means that higher overtime payments to junior hospital doctors cut the money available for other purposes.
Therefore although the clinician will usually decide upon the service equivalent of a given need, his decision-and therefore the service equivalent itself-will be influenced by three other critical factors: firstly, the probability that the use of the service equivalent he proposes will lead to an acceptable outcome (see Fig. 2) ; secondly, that resource equivalents are available to provide it; and thirdly, that the ethical issues have been faced. The ethical dilemma that underlies an increasing amount of medical practice is a dilemma which may more often be covert than overt. It is very real nevertheless. As Campbell (1977) X , , , , , , , , X , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
